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PRIVATE EQUITY TAKEOVERS AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UK: SOME 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Issue: This study investigates the employment consequences of private equity 
acquisitions, in particular institutional buy-outs (IBOs), in the UK.  It involves a pre and post-
acquisition analysis of employment and performance characteristics for a sample of acquired 
firms and a matched sample of non-acquired firms.   
Research Findings: There is a significant decrease in employment in acquired firms in the year 
immediately after the completion of the IBO compared with non-acquired firms.  Further 
analysis fails to identify any parallel or subsequent increase in firm productivity or profitability.  
This evidence suggests that the observed downsizing has not been effective either in disciplining 
staff or imparting a clearer focus to activities. 
Academic Implications: The results of this study add to our understanding of the employment 
effects of private equity acquisitions, especially IBOs.  Two important theoretical issues emerge. 
The first is a need to conceptualize skills and human capabilities on a collective dimension, 
specific to a particular organizational setting, and the extent to which they contribute to the 
organization’s performance.  The second is the importance of understanding managers as 
operating in particular social settings, making subjective choices based on their specific 
knowledge and experiences. 
 Practitioner Implications: The main practitioner implication of our study is that companies 
acquired via IBO do not exhibit increased productivity or profitability in the wake of a 
significant reduction in employment.  This highlights the need for new management to better 
understand the link between employment and performance in the specific corporate setting of the 
acquired firm. 
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PRIVATE EQUITY TAKEOVERS AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UK: SOME 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an emerging research interest in the relationship between governance, sources of 
company finance and the consequences for employees, with existing work predominantly 
focusing on comparisons of the effects of national regulatory regimes (Botero, Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Goergen, Brewster, & Wood, 2009).  Such issues 
tend to become especially highlighted in the case of takeovers of public companies by private 
equity investors.  Private equity acquisitions have been on the increase since the late 1990s 
(Renneboog, Simons, & Wright, 2007) and the increased takeover activity by private equity 
houses has been causing public concern about its consequences. While the involvement of 
private equity in the takeover of public companies traditionally focused on relatively small 
companies, often facilitating management buy-outs, more recent transactions have highlighted 
the potential for some of the largest UK companies to be the targets of such acquisitions (e.g. 
Alliance-Boots).  Indeed, Thornton (2007) suggests that as many as 20 per cent of all private 
sector workers in the UK are employed by organisations with some private equity investment.  
This has raised concerns about the welfare of substantial numbers of employees with employee 
representatives calling both for greater transparency from private equity acquirers and legislative 
changes to safeguard employee rights.  For example, on 24 February 2007, Brendan Barber, the 
General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), challenged private equity investors to 
attend a roundtable and “to tell [the public] what they stand for and whether they accept any 
responsibilities to their workforce or the wider community” (Barber, 2007:1). 
Page 3 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
3 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of private equity acquisitions on 
employment and employees in a sample of UK private equity acquisitions.    Our study focuses 
specifically on institutional buy-outs (IBOs).  We examine whether there are changes to 
employee numbers, employee productivity, employee remuneration as well as profitability both 
in the years prior to the acquisition and in the post-acquisition period.  We also utilise an industry 
and size-matched control sample of non-acquired firms in order to isolate precisely the 
employment consequences of our sample of private equity acquisitions.  Our study provides an 
important and contemporary empirical contribution to the ongoing public debate on the impact of 
private equity acquisitions and also serves as a useful contribution to existing academic research 
on the employment consequences of corporate takeovers. 
Much of the existing research on the employment consequences of takeovers has been 
motivated by the Shleifer & Summers (1988) seminal article where they argued that a change in 
ownership permits new management to renegotiate the implicit contracts of employment of 
existing workers resulting in a breach of trust insofar as it violates prior expectations attached to 
employees’ implicit labour contracts.  Subsequent research has sought to address this question by 
investigating the impact of takeovers on employment and/or wages both in the context of 
takeovers generally (e.g. Denis, 1994; McGuckin & Nguyen, 2001; Conyon, Girma, Thompson, 
& Wright, 2001, 2002 and 2004; Beckman & Forbes, 2004; and Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2004) and 
specifically in the context of management buy-outs (MBOs) (e.g. Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; 
Bacon, Wright, & Demina, 2004; Amess & Wright, 2007; Weir, Jones, & Wright, 2008 and 
Amess & Wright, 2010).   Overall, there is little consistent support for the Shleifer & Summers 
(1988) hypothesis with researchers identifying different findings depending on whether the 
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acquisition is hostile or friendly, the type of staff (white collar versus production staff), the 
extent of post-acquisition divestment, and also the period being studied. 
Research examining the employment effects of private equity takeovers is only now 
emerging in the literature, often forming part of a larger study of takeovers and/or MBOs 
generally (Amess, Brown, & Thompson, 2007; Amess & Wright, 2007 and 2010; Weir et al., 
2008).  However, studying private equity acquisitions, specifically IBOs, as a homogenous group 
has potential to take forward our understanding of this increasingly important phenomenon in a 
number of respects.  First, private equity-backed IBOs typically involve the complete 
replacement of existing managers, hence weakening the social and implicit employment 
agreements with employees.  Consequently, incoming managers are likely to take a more 
objective view of how best to utilise employees in the pursuit of owner wealth, raising questions 
about both employment levels and wage levels.  Second, private equity-backed IBOs are often 
financed by significant levels of debt and this debt burden is likely to put additional pressure on 
management to seek economies, especially in reducing the overall wage bill. Third, it is 
generally anticipated that private equity acquirers will seek to recover their investment and any 
profits within a reasonably short time-frame so may be more focused in seeking to eliminate 
unnecessary costs as soon as possible after the takeover, putting employees and associated costs 
particularly under the spotlight. 
The paper is structured as follows:  the next section provides a comprehensive review of 
prior research on the impact of ownership changes on employment and employees, concluding 
with a discussion of the likely impact of private equity acquisitions on employment.  The 
following section introduces the sample, variables and outlines the research methodology.  This 
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is followed by our empirical analysis.  Our conclusions, limitations of our study and a discussion 
of the academic and practitioner implications of our findings are presented in the final section. 
 
OWNERSHIP CHANGES AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR EMPLOYEES 
Changes in company ownership have been an important area of academic inquiry in the 
economic and finance literature over the past fifty years.  The vast majority of work in the area 
has focused on the economic impact of takeovers of public companies, initially in relation to 
changes in market share and the effect of mergers on competitiveness and more recently 
examining issues surrounding wealth changes, specifically in respect of shareholders in the 
bidder and target firms.  Central to much of this research has been the assumption that takeovers 
are an important mechanism for achieving the most efficient use of corporate assets (Manne, 
1965; Jensen, 1986).  This view is further strengthened by the significant premiums acquiring 
companies pay in order to obtain control of another firm’s assets (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 
2001).  In an environment of companies being acquired for prices significantly in excess of their 
market value, a key question concerns the sources of the expected wealth gains. 
In a seminal article, Shleifer & Summers (1988) argued that one potential source of 
wealth extraction may come from the target firm’s employees since a change in ownership 
permits new management to renegotiate the implicit contracts of employment of existing 
workers.  How this may occur in practice, in addition to the laying off of staff, has been 
discussed by a number of researchers.  For example, employees may work for lower wages early 
in their career and remain committed to the organization in the expectation of higher wages as 
they advance up the salary scale.  However, given that older workers are likely to be more 
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expensive, firms have an incentive to renege on this implicit arrangement, a process that may be 
facilitated by a takeover (Beckmann & Forbes 2004).   
Researchers have also suggested that the nature of the takeover may influence subsequent 
employment.  For example, Conyon et al. (2002) argue that the risk of a renegotiation of 
employment contracts is more likely in the case of hostile acquisitions for two reasons. First, the 
fact that the incoming management team acquired the firm against the wishes of the company is 
a clear signal that the new management team would pose a very credible threat in any 
confrontation with employees.  Second, the fact that the management team is new means it is 
unlikely to have developed any significant ties with existing employees in the same way that the 
incumbent management team would.  Denis (1994) suggests that employees are more likely to 
come under pressure after a horizontal takeover, where two companies in the same industry 
come together, because a significant level of duplication is expected to exist after the takeover.  
Furthermore, Beckmann & Forbes (2004) suggest that the likelihood of a breach of trust after 
acquisitions is likely to be positively related to the extent of the bid premium the acquirer has 
had to pay. The remainder of this section reviews the existing research evidence on the impact of 
ownership changes on employees.  The review begins by looking at the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions generally and then progresses to focus on the employment impact of MBOs and 
private equity acquisitions in particular. 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
A relatively small number of studies have sought to investigate the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on employees.  Essentially, these studies focus on the impact of takeovers on 
employment or the impact on wages, or both.  In one of the earliest studies in the US, Denis 
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(1994) examines the impact of takeovers on employment between 1975 and 1984. Denis (1994) 
finds that the number of employees declined significantly after hostile acquisitions in the 1980-
84 period but finds no evidence of post-acquisition declines following takeovers prior to 1980 
and for friendly acquisitions between 1980-84. Furthermore, she finds that the reported declines 
occur in plants originally owned by the acquirer and not the target and suggests these declines 
are related to broader restructuring by acquirers and not an attempt to breach existing labour 
contracts. These findings are reinforced by McGuckin & Nguyen (2001) who report that post-
acquisition job losses are more likely to occur in larger factories owned by the acquiring firm 
rather than significantly impacting on the employees of the target. These two studies seem to 
provide some support for job reductions after takeovers but find no evidence that employees in 
the acquired company are especially targeted. 
Beckman & Forbes (2004) argue that, if there is a breach of trust subsequent to takeover, 
then employees may have to pay through lay-offs and wage cuts for excessive bid premiums paid 
by acquirers. Based on a UK sample, the authors fail to find evidence to support this hypothesis, 
concluding that rather than a gain by shareholders at the expense of employees, both the new 
shareholders and employees may be locked in a form of “equal misery” (ibid: 163) following the 
takeover due to the much documented evidence of acquisitions performing badly. Further, 
Goergen et al. (2006) found that it was more likely that those firms which have implicit contracts 
in place renege on these contracts ex post by adopting practices with more damaging effects for 
their workforce, most notably leaner staffing and hence redundancies.  Finally, based on a 20-
year study of the Californian savings and loans industry, Haveman & Cohen (1994) found that, 
in general, mergers tend to destroy jobs and directly increase both exits from the organization 
and from the industry at large. 
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Conyon et al. (2001 and 2002) examine the demand for labour after takeovers in the UK 
between 1967 and 1996.   In a study of the period 1983 to 1996, Conyon et al. (2001) find that 
demand for labour decreased for all acquirers in the region of 7.5 per cent, but they fail to 
identify any differences depending on whether the takeover was hostile or friendly. Over the 
longer term, between 1967 and 1996, Conyon et al., (2002) report significantly larger decreases 
in the demand for labour arising from hostile and related bids.   Based on French data, Margolis 
(2006) found that, in the case of mergers, employees of the acquired firm were more likely to 
leave/lose their jobs in the period immediately following the acquisition.  Over time, however, 
these differences disappeared, suggesting that the effects of a takeover are more short-term, even 
if the effects are carried over to the medium and long terms.  Based on a case study of a single 
organization, Björkman & Søderberg (2006) argue that mergers can have the effect of diverting 
managerial attention towards financial outcomes at the expense of the strategic development of 
the rest of the organization. Indeed, reviews by Andrade et al. (2001) and Tuch & O’Sullivan 
(2007) note that mergers do not appear to result in overall organization-wide productivity gains. 
Rosett (1990) sought to investigate whether the premiums paid to target shareholders 
during takeover contests were subsequently reclaimed from employees through less favourable 
wage settlements.  Analysing a large sample of such settlements over the pre- and post-takeover 
period Rosett (1990) finds little evidence to support this hypothesis.  In the UK, Conyon et al. 
(2004) also investigate the impact of mergers on wage levels and find no evidence that mergers 
had a negative impact on wage levels.  Indeed, Conyon et al. (2004) report that both wages and 
profitability increased after mergers with related acquisitions being associated with higher 
wages.  Focusing on hostile takeovers, Gokhale, Groshen, & Neumark (1995) investigate 
whether takeover targets experience extra-marginal wages prior to being acquired and then go on 
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to see whether takeovers result in any subsequent changes.  Gokhale et al. (1995) find no 
evidence of extra-marginal wages being paid to employees prior to the acquisition.  However, 
their study does report a reduction in the relative employment of more tenured (and likely more 
expensive) workers after the acquisition.   
 
Management Buy-Outs/Private Equity 
It was suggested earlier that the nature of takeovers may influence the subsequent experience of 
employees.  This expectation has prompted researchers to investigate the employment 
consequences of companies, or parts of companies, that are subject to a management buy-out 
(MBO) or other private equity related acquisitions. Table 1 summarises these studies including 
details of the studies as well as summarising the main findings.  Two of the earlier MBO studies 
were undertaken in the US and broadly followed the approach discussed earlier for general 
mergers and acquisitions research, i.e. comparing employment levels before and after the MBO 
transaction using public data.  Kaplan’s (1989) study sought to investigate whether MBOs led to 
a reduction in employment.  He found no evidence of employment reductions, indeed there was 
evidence that firms increased employment after MBOs.  Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) focused on 
testing Jensen’s (1989) argument that one way MBOs achieve efficiency is by replacing direct 
monitoring by large bureaucracies with a more incentive orientated approach.  First, Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1990) found a very significant decline in the level of employment of non-productive 
staff (approximately 8.5 per cent) thereby adjusting the production/non-production ratio in 
favour of productive staff.  Second, they found an increase of approximately 3.6 per cent in 
annual compensation of production workers compared to a slight decline in the compensation of 
non-production staff. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
More recent studies have approached the investigation of the employment consequences 
of MBOs/private equity acquisitions from two perspectives. On the one hand, studies such as 
Amess & Wright (2007); Amess et al. (2007); Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner, & Miranda 
(2008) and Weir et al. (2008) employ secondary data to ascertain whether changes in 
employment, wages and productivity can be identified either by comparing firm characteristics 
before and after the acquisition and/or benchmarking against a non-acquired control group.  On 
the other hand, studies such as Bacon et al. (2004), Bacon, Wright, Demina, Bruining, & Boselie 
(2008), Bacon, Wright, Scholes, & Meuleman (2010) and Bruining, Boselie, Wright, & Bacon 
(2005) employ questionnaire surveys to obtain insights on any alternations to HR practices after 
the acquisition.   
As shown in Table 1, there has been significant recent interest in seeking to understand 
the employment consequences of MBOs/private equity acquisitions.  Quantitative studies 
seeking to ascertain employment consequences have produced mixed results but, on the whole, 
show little consistent evidence that MBOs/private equity acquisitions have a negative impact on 
employment.  For example, in the UK, Amess & Wright (2007) find no discernable differences 
in employment growth rates between LBO firms and non-LBO firms, even though there is some 
evidence of lower wage growth in the LBO sample.  Taking a slightly different perspective, 
Amess et al. (2007) find that employees in firms subject to MBOs enjoy a greater degree of 
discretion over their work practices than non-MBO firms.  It should be noted that a recent US 
study by Davis et al. (2008) presents a more negative picture with MBO firms experiencing 
Page 11 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
11 
 
significantly lower employment growth rates than non-MBO firms in the three years after the 
acquisition.  However, in years four and five after the acquisition, Davis et al.’s (2008) study 
documents a reversal with MBO firms showing significantly higher employment growth rates 
than their non-MBO counterparts.   
A useful recent development in this area of analysis has been an attempt by researchers to 
disaggregate MBO acquisitions in terms of sources of finance, specifically seeking to focus on 
whether private equity-backed deals exhibit different post-acquisition employment 
characteristics compared to non-private equity transactions.  Amess & Wright (2007) segregate 
their sample between MBOs and MBIs and find that the post-acquisition employment growth 
rates in MBIs is significantly lower than for other MBOs.  Interestingly, in a subsequent study, 
Amess & Wright (2010) segregate their sample of LBO acquisitions between those with private 
equity involvement and those without and report no significant differences in employment either 
between private equity-backed LBOs and other LBOs or between private equity-backed LBOs 
and a control sample of non-LBOs.  Finally, Weir et al. (2008) focus on firms acquired in public-
to-private acquisitions and report that job losses in their sample firms are at a lower rate than 
firms in the same industries that remain public. 
Using questionnaire surveys of firms having gone through MBOs in the UK, Bacon et al. 
(2004) find that a significant number of respondents report an increase in the importance of 
HRM and the resources devoted to it subsequent to MBO.  Examples include: increased 
employment, greater employee involvement, increased training, greater flexibility and increases 
in share ownership by staff.  In subsequent surveys, both in the UK and across Europe, Bruining 
et al. (2005) and Bacon et al. (2008) reinforce this positive impression of HRM practices after 
MBOs, specifically reporting an increase in the number of high commitment practices.  Bacon et 
Page 12 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
12 
 
al. (2010) look specifically at HR issues after private equity-backed MBOs and find no evidence 
that the new ownership results in changes to union recognition, union membership density or 
management attitudes to union membership.  Furthermore, Bacon et al. (2010) find a greater 
level of employee consultation by management after private equity acquisitions. 
 
Private Equity Acquisitions 
Under the broad term of private equity are two fundamentally different types of investor 
behaviour (Wood & Wright, 2010).  The first, venture capital, involves early stage investors who 
provide capital in return for input in setting organizational direction.  There is a general 
consensus that the effects of this are generally positive (Wood & Wright, 2010).  In contrast, 
what is sometimes referred to as private equity per se, is when an investor purchases, or 
facilitates in the purchase of a firm, on the premise that either new management, or at least a 
change in managerial style, may enhance returns.  In effect, this involves the acquisition of 
publicly quoted companies and taking them private via so called public to private transactions 
(PTPs)1 or the takeover of non-listed companies by private equity firms.   
Following on from a first wave in the 1980s, a second wave from the mid-1990s onwards 
has attracted much debate and controversy (see Wood & Wright, 2009).  Renneboog et al. (2007) 
usefully classify such PTP transactions into three sub-groups: (i) management buy-outs (MBOs) 
where the incumbent management seeks institutional support from private equity firms to 
purchase a major stake in the firm and to fund the transaction which aims at taking the firm 
private; (ii) management buy-ins (MBIs) arise where a team of outside managers or 
entrepreneurs purchase all or most of the equity; (iii) institutional buy-outs (IBOs) represent 
deals where the bidding group consists solely of institutional investors and private equity houses 
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and any equity stake held by management arises from their remuneration package.  From an 
employee perspective, the consequences of MBOs might be expected to be more positive (or less 
negative) since the existing management team remains suggesting that the existing management-
employee relationship might remain unaltered.2  Managers are likely to be bound to their 
workforce through implicit contracts, and are likely to have sunk emotional capital in the firm.  
MBIs and IBOs on the other hand typically introduce an external management team who are less 
likely to be loyal to the existing workforce, especially if employees had opposed the takeover 
transaction, and might be expected to seek renegotiation of existing employment contracts as 
hypothesised by Shleifer & Summers (1988). 
In the finance literature, IBOs have long been viewed as a useful mechanism in seeking to 
reduce the agency problem between widely dispersed shareholders and managers. Specifically, 
as argued by Jensen (2006) and Wright, Renneboog, Simons, & Scholes (2006), private equity 
ownership restores the separation between ownership and control by putting in place active 
investors who provide more direct scrutiny of managerial behaviour and consequently are 
expected to deliver greater shareholder-orientated performance.  It can be argued that 
improvements in technology and management techniques mean that firms are capable of 
operating on far leaner staffing levels than before (Wruck, 2008; Jensen, 2010).  Quite simply, as 
the firm becomes leaner, there is less room for sub-optimal staff to hide.  Moreover, measures to 
reduce the labour intensity of productive processes may result in overall productivity and 
efficiency gains (Harris, Siegel, & Wright, 2005).  Organizations that lag behind in this process 
are likely to be rendered uncompetitive (Wruck, 2008; Jensen, 2010).  Wruck (2008) argues that 
IBOs can play an important role in pioneering best practice since they provide evidence of the 
benefits of dispassionate investor behaviour.  When owners, and managers as their agents, have 
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fewer personal ties and implicit commitments, they are more likely to promote the inevitable 
agenda of downsizing and productivity enhancement.   
The large premiums associated with such takeovers, typically in excess of 40 per cent, 
appear consistent with bidders’ expectations of significantly improved post-acquisition 
performance (Renneboog et al., 2007).  However, the precise way in which such improved 
performance is achieved remains unclear.  Renneboog et al. (2007:1) argued that “there has been 
no systematic research on the sources of shareholder wealth gains in UK going private 
transactions”.  More recent work has partially redressed this gap (Weir et al., 2008; Guo, 
Hotchkiss, & Song, 2010), but evidence on the consequences for employees and other 
stakeholders remains mixed, suggesting a diversity of outcomes (Wood & Wright, 2009). 
In view of the above, it is possible for us to identify a number of related issues regarding 
the impact of private equity acquisitions on employment.  First, the general literature on mergers 
and acquisitions, in particular when taking the agency theory perspective, suggests that 
employees are likely to be adversely affected by a private equity funded takeover. This is 
expected to arise for a number of reasons.  First, such takeovers are likely to facilitate the 
reigning in of managers, and their closer subordination to the agenda of generating value for 
owners. Second, changes in ownership are likely to open opportunities for challenging existing 
ways of doing things and allow for the recasting of relations within the firm which is expected to 
lead to downsizing and the liquidation of assets.  More pragmatically, it could be argued that, as 
private equity takeovers often target underperforming or failing organizations, job losses will 
often be inevitable.  Moreover, in a general climate of downsizing, a private equity takeover may 
only hasten the inevitable, leading to organizational restructuring on more favourable terms than 
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would be the case if it was deferred (Wruck, 2008).  Indeed, when placed on a firmer footing, the 
organization may have room to prosper and expand its activities, allowing for re-hiring. 
Alternatively, more associational approaches would suggest that specific forms of private 
equity facilitated takeovers may in fact allow managers greater autonomy to harness their insider 
knowledge as to the skills and capacities of workers, allowing for more focused human resource 
development and flatter organizations associated with greater worker autonomy.   This reflects 
recent theoretical work that focuses on the relative autonomy possessed by actors to make key 
strategic choices, particularly at key instances where there are specific opportunities for 
innovation (Sorge, 2005).  In other words, whilst actors operate under constraints in terms of 
governance and implicit rules, at specific moments, there are opportunities to innovate, forming 
the basis for new ways of doing things.  Having some understanding of the value of existing 
human capital, they will be more reluctant to liquidate it.   
Aoki (2010: 30) argues that, over time, organizations gradually accumulate “cognitive 
assets”.  This is more than simply the lump sum of individual human capital as it refers to the 
skills and capabilities of employees in the context of a particular “mode of associational 
cognition” (ibid.: 30).  The latter refers to how human assets are related to each other and the 
context in which they operate (ibid.: 31).  In other words, Aoki (2010) argues that individuals do 
not only possess externally marketable (and, hence, costable) skills, but also specific knowledge 
and capabilities relevant to the firm they operate in. This knowledge and these capabilities allow 
for firm specific complementarities when used in conjunction with peers’ own knowledge sets.  
This is very difficult for outsiders to cost accurately but explains why existing managers are 
likely to have closer ties and implicit agreements with workers, which they may be reluctant to 
renege on.  In other words, managers do not hang on to surplus staff in the interests of personally 
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motivated empire building, but because they are better equipped to cost the worth of the firm’s 
human capabilities as a whole. In contrast, in the case of MBIs, the ejection of the existing 
management team means that such ties are weakened and, as a consequence, it will be harder for 
a new management team to accurately cost human and collective cognitive capital.  As a result, it 
is likely that efficiency gains will be sought through sweating rather than nurturing human assets. 
As noted earlier, private equity-backed IBOs typically involve changing the management team 
and reducing the social and implicit employment agreements with employees.   
This leads to two alternative propositions. The first is that IBOs are likely to result in 
greater job shedding, given that this provides an effective means of solving the agency problem, 
and reversing accumulated managerial empire building. Such job shedding will also facilitate 
significant productivity enhancements.  The second is that whilst IBOs are likely to result in 
greater job shedding, owing to the weaker ties that will exist between a new managerial team and 
rank-and-file workers, this will not result in productivity enhancements.  Rather, as new 
managers will not be able to accurately cost the cognitive capabilities of the firm’s employees, 
this will result in accumulated assets being sacrificed for short-term gain. 
  
SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
Our sample of private equity acquisitions covers the period 2000 to 2006 in the UK. We first 
downloaded the list of IBOs from the Deals module in Thomson One Banker. In a second stage, 
we verified whether all acquisitions were indeed IBOs. As a result some acquisitions were 
excluded from the initial list. In a third stage, we included acquisitions that had been left out 
from the initial list. These were acquisitions that Thomson One Banker considered to have been 
made by strategic investors rather than institutional investors. Thomson One Banker defines the 
Page 17 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
17 
 
former as long-term investors whereas the latter typically have shorter horizons. As we found 
this definition somewhat arbitrary, we decided to include these additional acquisitions in our 
sample. We arrived at a total of 73 acquisitions of UK public companies completed over the 
period 2000 to 2006.  Table 2 provides a breakdown of the industrial classification of our sample 
of acquisitions.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Since our objective was to investigate issues surrounding employment and employees 
before and after the takeover we sought to collect data for each firm for three years prior to the 
takeover and three years after the completion of the acquisition, providing us with a seven year 
window surrounding the acquisition.  Table 3 provides a breakdown of the 73 takeovers we 
include in our analysis in terms of year of acquisition. In what follows, we define year 0 as the 
year when the acquisition was completed and all other years are expressed relative to year 0. For 
example year -1 denotes the year preceding the year of the acquisition. 
 In order to assess the effects on performance and the number of employees of the private 
equity acquisition, we attempted to match each of our sample firms with a non-acquired firm 
with the same three-digit SIC code and the closest turnover (our measure for firm size) in year 0 
(or year -1 if the year 0 turnover figure was not available for the sample firm)3.  Finally, each 
control firm had to survive until year 2 at least. We were able to match 66 of our sample firms 
following the above criteria. Another two sample firms could be matched with a control firm that 
survived only until year 1. Table 3 shows the breakdown of control firms across time. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to adequately address our research objectives we set out to obtain data on our 
sample of acquisitions both before and after the completion of the acquisition.  Since we are 
focusing on public companies acquired by private equity houses, i.e. institutional buy-outs 
(IBOs), obtaining data on the firms for the three years prior to acquisition was not a problem as 
the annual reports and accounts of listed companies are easily obtained.  However, of the 73 
firms in our sample, six were acquired within three years of their initial listing and one was 
acquired within two years of its initial listing, leaving us with available data covering all three 
years prior to the takeover for 67 firms, two years data for 72 firms and one year data for 72 
firms.   
Since we are focusing on private equity takeovers, once the firm is acquired it is typically 
de-listed from the stock exchange and becomes a private company.  This significantly 
complicates the collection of data as it is not easy to trace and/or identify the private firm.  In 
order to overcome this we undertook exhaustive checks of both the Companies House database 
as well as the FAME database in order to locate the acquired firm.  This resulted in us being able 
to locate usable post-acquisition data for 48 firms for the year after the year of acquisition and 50 
firms and 42 firms for years 2 and 3, respectively.  The main source of data was each company’s 
annual report and accounts.  For a number of companies it simply proved impossible to trace the 
company post-acquisition; for others we actually found the post-acquisition records but they did 
not contain data on our key variables.  Finally, for a small number of firms, even though the 
financial records were located, the size and operation was so different from the pre-acquisition 
firm we decided any comparisons would be meaningless so these were excluded.  Table 4 
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contains a summary of the number of firms we were able to source useful data on for the pre- 
and post-acquisition periods. The table also shows the equivalent statistics for the control firms. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 In what follows, we perform a quantitative analysis to identify the effects of IBOs on firm 
performance, employment and productivity. While the size of our sample prevents us from 
estimating a labour demand function as in e.g. Conyon et al. (2001 and 2002), we nevertheless 
include in our univariate analysis all the variables that would be included in such a function. In 
detail, Conyon et al. (2001 and 2002) base themselves on Nickell (1984) and assume that firms 
have quadratic cost functions, a Cobb-Douglas technology and are output constrained. Under 
these assumptions, employment can then be described by the following adjustment equation: 
ittitiittiittiit wwQQLL εηγδδββα +++++++= −−− 1,211,211,  
where Lit, Qit and wit are the logarithm of employment, the logarithm of real output and the 
logarithm of real wages relative to the user cost of capital, respectively; γi, ηt, and εit are the firm-
specific effects, the time-specific effects and an error term. In what follows, we measure 
employment by the annual growth rate in the number of employees (Table 5), output by turnover 
(Table 8) and wages by the total of wages and salaries (Table 9). We also include two measures 
of profitability, i.e. profit over turnover (Table 6) and profit over employees (Table 7). 
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FINDINGS 
Empirical Analysis 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics on the growth rate in the number of employees for 
each of the two years before the acquisition and each of the three years following the acquisition. 
We lose the first year of data, i.e. year -3, given that we need two years to calculate each annual 
percentage change in employment. The mean and median growth rates are reported separately 
for the sample firms and the control firms, respectively, in Panel A. Panel B contains the test 
statistics for the difference in means (medians) between each pair of adjacent years for the 
sample companies and the control companies, respectively. The test statistics used consist of a 
two-tailed t-test for the difference in means and a non-parametric Wilcoxon sign-rank test for the 
difference in medians. Finally, Panel C contains the equivalent test statistics for the difference in 
means (medians) between the sample companies and the control companies for each of the 
individual years. In other words, Panel B enables us to compare the growth in employment 
across time for a given type of firms (the sample firms or the control firms) whereas Panel C 
enables us to compare the growth in the number of employees between the sample firms and the 
control firms. 
Panel A suggests that, when the median growth rate in the number of employees is 
considered, the control companies experience a slow, but steady increase in employment until 
year 3 when employment decreases by more than one percentage point. However, the median 
growth rate in employment is much more volatile for the sample companies. The median 
company experiences an increase in the number of employees of roughly 3 per cent in year -2, no 
change in year -1 and a decrease of -3 per cent in year 1. After year 1, the growth rate is back to 
the levels experienced in the control firms. In contrast, mean growth rates are much more volatile 
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for both the sample companies and the control companies. Nevertheless, the means still suggest 
that there is a reduction in employment in the sample firms in the year following the private 
equity acquisition, but no such reduction in the control companies. Surprisingly, the control firms 
experience a drop in employment in year 3. 
Panel B of Table 5 suggests that there is a significant decrease in employment in the 
sample companies from the year preceding the acquisition to the year following the acquisition. 
The difference in growth is significant at the 10 per cent confidence level, but only if the median 
is considered. There is no such significant decrease for the mean growth rate. Finally, there is 
some evidence that the growth in employment slows downs significantly over the years 
following the acquisition for the control firms. Indeed, the mean difference in the growth rates 
between year 1 and year 2 and the median growth rates between year 2 and year 3 are significant 
at the 10 per cent level and the 5 per cent level, respectively. To summarise the results so far, 
there is some evidence of a significant decrease in employment in the sample companies around 
the time of their acquisition. However, employment numbers also seem to evolve in cycles as 
evidenced by the significant decrease in employment in the control firms in year 3. 
More importantly, Panel C shows that there is a significant difference in the growth rate 
in employment in year 1 between the sample companies and the control companies. This is the 
case for both the t-test for the difference in means and the Wilcoxon sign-rank test for the 
difference in medians: both test statistics are significant at the 5 per cent level. Further, while 
Panel B suggested that there are cycles in the employment in both the sample companies and the 
control companies, these cycles are not reflected in the form of significant differences between 
the two types of companies in Panel C. In other words, whereas Panel B showed some evidence 
of a significant drop in employment in the control companies in year 3, Panel C suggests that 
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there is no significant difference in the employment growth rate between the sample companies 
and the control companies in year 3. Hence, the results in Table 5 indicate that private equity 
investors reduce employment in their target firms after the acquisition. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The question that now arises is whether the observed reduction in the number of 
employees is reflected in an increase in profitability and productivity. Table 6 reports descriptive 
statistics for the ratio of profit to turnover, our first measure of profitability. When the average 
profit over turnover ratio is considered, both the sample companies and the control companies 
seem to experience clear cycles in their profitability. However, the cycles seem out of sync. In 
other words, profitability is down for the sample firms during the years preceding their 
acquisition while it is down for the control firms during the years following the acquisition. This 
is in line with what was observed in Table 5 for the percentage change in the number of 
employees. However, when the focus is on the median profit over turnover ratio rather than the 
mean ratio both the sample companies and the control companies experience fairly stable profit 
rates. Panel B suggests that the control firms experience a significant decrease in profitability at 
the 10 per cent level between year 1 and 2 based on the mean ratio. However, there is no such 
significant difference for the median ratio. Panel C shows that the economic differences in 
profitability between the sample companies and the control companies observed in Panel A are 
not statistically significant. Hence, while Table 5 revealed a significant decrease in employment 
in the private equity targets after the acquisition this decrease is not reflected in an increase in 
profitability.  
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INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7 is based on the alternative measure of profitability, i.e. profit per employee.  Similar to 
Table 6, the median rates of profitability are fairly comparable across the sample companies and 
the control companies. However, there are differences in the mean rates of profitability. While 
the mean profitability of the sample companies is fairly constant over time with a small dip 
around the time of the acquisition, control firms experience much higher volatility in profitability 
with higher profitability during years -3 to 1 followed by a severe drop in profitability in year 2 
and a small loss per employee in year 3. However, Panels B and C do not suggest that there are 
any significant differences across time or between the sample companies and the control 
companies. Hence, neither Table 6 nor Table 7 suggests that targets of private equity acquisitions 
perform significantly worse when compared to non-acquired firms in the same industry and of a 
similar size as measured by turnover. Again, the sample companies seem to be at a different 
stage in their profitability cycle than the control companies. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
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 Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for our output or productivity measure, i.e. turnover 
over employees. Similar to the previous tables on profitability rates, the medians are fairly 
comparable between the sample and control companies. Also in line with the previous tables, 
there are clear economic differences in the means between the sample firms and the control 
firms. However, there are no statistically significant differences across time or between the two 
types of companies.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Looking at the evidence presented in tables 5 to 8 above in the context of our original 
propositions we find support for the second proposition and not for the first.  In other words, 
while we document a significant reduction in employment in target firms after IBOs, this is not 
followed by improvements either in the profit or productivity of these firms. 
Table 9 contains descriptive statistics for the wages per employee. When the wages of the 
median employee are considered, there are virtually no differences between the sample 
companies and the control companies. However, the wage of the average employee experiences 
an increase over years -1 to 3 for the control companies but not for the sample companies. Still, 
Panels B and C do not provide any evidence of significant differences across time or between the 
sample companies and the control companies. Hence, there does not seem to be any evidence 
that employees of IBOs lose out via a reduction in their wages. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
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 Following Smart & Waldfogel (1994), we perform a robustness check to test whether 
there is indeed no difference in performance between the sample companies and the control 
companies. The test consists of calculating the difference in the unexpected performance changes 
between the sample companies and the control companies. So far, we have performed two types 
of test. First, we compared the performance across time for the sample companies (as well as the 
control companies). This is a fairly rudimentary test as it does not properly adjust for cycles in 
profitability. In other words, if private equity targets are taken over when their performance is 
below the historical average then one would expect an improvement in performance after the 
acquisition independent of whether private equity investors create value or not. Second, we 
compared the sample companies to the control companies for each of the three years preceding 
the acquisition as well as each of the three years following the acquisition. This second test is an 
improvement on the first test which assumed that any increase in profitability is uniquely due to 
the acquisition. Conversely, the second test adjusts for the possibility that both the acquired firm 
and the control firm (i.e. the whole industry) may experience a profitability shock. However, this 
second test assumes that any industry-wide shock in performance will be the same across the 
acquired and non-acquired firms. Hence, Smart & Waldfogel (1994) suggest using a more 
general model to compare the performance of acquired and non-acquired firms consisting of 
what they call the difference in surprises. The difference in surprises consists of taking the 
difference between the actual performance for a given year after the acquisition and the 
performance forecast for the same year made before the acquisition of the sample firm minus the 
equivalent difference for the control firm. In other words, the difference in surprises consists of 
the difference in unexpected changes in performance between the acquired firm and the non-
acquired firm.  In line with Smart & Waldfogel (1994), we measure performance by the ratio of 
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profit over turnover. However, the main issue with this test is that the data requirements are 
substantial. Indeed, it requires that analyst forecasts dating back to the year before the acquisition 
exist for both the acquired firm and the control firm. This is not always the case for various 
reasons. In particular, the sample firm (as well as the size-matched control firm) may be too 
small to attract an analyst following. Further, while some firms may have an analyst following, a 
performance forecast is not always made for every financial year. Finally, for some firms there is 
a forecast for the profit, but not for turnover. 
Forecasts were obtained from Datastream (IBES) for the year preceding the acquisition. 
The forecasts are the mean analyst forecasts for profit and for turnover. The forecasts refer to 
years 1, 2 and 3 after the acquisition.  Table 10 contains the results of this robustness check. We 
were able to compute the difference in surprises for 14 of our sample firms and the equivalent 
control firms for year 1, nine firms for year 2 and only one firm for year 3. Panel A of the table 
shows that while there is a small difference in the mean surprise for years 1 and 2, there is no 
such difference when the median surprise is considered. The t-test as well as the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon test in Panel B suggests that the difference in surprises is not statistically significant at 
any of the usual levels of confidence. Hence, while this additional test suffers from a small 
number of observations it nevertheless confirms our previous results that there is no difference in 
performance between the sample firms and the control firms. 
 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The documented increase in the takeover of public companies by private equity firms in 
recent years has raised important questions about the consequences of such acquisitions for 
employees of the acquired firms.  In light of these concerns this study has undertaken an 
investigation of the impact of private equity takeovers on employees in a sample of acquired 
firms as well as a size and industry-matched sample of non-acquired firms.  A key innovation of 
our study is the focus on a particular category of private equity acquisition, institutional buy-outs 
(IBOs).  There is much public and trade union concern about the potential for these transactions 
to have negative employment consequences.   
The main finding from our empirical analysis is that employment in acquired firms 
reduces significantly in the year immediately after the completion of the IBO transaction 
compared to non-acquired firms. However, further analysis fails to identify any parallel or 
subsequent increase in productivity or profitability.  In other words, downsizing does not appear 
to be effective either in disciplining staff or in imparting a clearer focus to activities.  There are 
two possible reasons for this. The first is simply that job losses may have knock on effects on the 
morale of remaining staff (Redman & Wilkinson, 2006). The second is that a new management 
team imposed through an IBO will lack detailed insider knowledge as to the firm’s “cognitive 
assets” (Aoki, 2010: 30-31). Rather than reversing perversely motivated empire building, 
restructuring may result in a loss of such accumulated capabilities; hence, any gains through the 
discipline and more effective divisions of labour will be offset. 
Even though we believe our analysis represents a very significant contribution to the on-
going debate about private equity and employment, we are also aware of some limitations in our 
analysis.  First, while we sought to include all IBOs taking place in the UK between 2000 and 
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2006, we appreciate that our findings may not be generizable to periods before 2000.  Second, 
we are also aware that following acquired firms for periods longer than three years after the 
acquisition is capable of improving further our understanding of the employment consequences 
of such acquisitions.  Therefore, future research could usefully investigate the employment 
consequences of IBOs over a longer period of time, especially periods sufficiently long to enable 
a better understanding of the role of such acquisitions in the overall life-cycle of the target firms.  
Third, it is worth noting that some acquired firms who go through a significant reorganisation 
subsequent to the acquisition will not have been included in our analysis since we relied on the 
availability of financial statements subsequent to acquisition for much of our data.  In other 
words, this sample selection or attrition bias may actually hide the true extent of employment 
reduction subsequent to IBO.  Fourth, since this is an initial assessment of the consequences of 
IBOs on employment, we thought it best to use both industry and size to select our matched 
sample of non-target firms.  Future research could also examine the potential for matching a 
control sample of firms based on pre-bid performance to provide a further dimension to our 
understanding of the role of pre-bid performance on the likelihood and consequences of IBOs.  
Finally, our study focuses exclusively on IBOs in the UK so future research could seek to 
replicate our investigation in other countries. 
We believe a number of important theoretical and practical implications emerge from our 
findings.  First, there is a need to conceptualize skills and human capabilities not only on an 
individual, but on a collective dimension, specific to a particular organizational setting, rather 
than the lump sum of what individuals may be worth on the external labour market (Aoki, 2010).   
In the case of private equity funded takeovers that do not involve the existing management team, 
this may result in the human capabilities of the organization being undervalued. Second, our 
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findings underline  the importance of understanding managers not just as slaves to universal 
personal drives (personal wealth and esteem through empire building), but also as operating in 
particular social settings, making subjective choices based on their specific knowledge and 
experiences of past events (see. Simmel,1981).  Therefore, those with more insider knowledge of 
the firm, as opposed to a completely new incoming managerial team, are more likely to have a 
more detailed and nuanced understanding of past events in the organization’s history and, as a 
result, be better able to formulate organizational strategies that draw on the wisdom that may 
flow from such experiences.  A takeover by ‘outsiders’ may result in this organization-specific 
learning being discarded, offsetting any gains from efficiency savings that may be garnered by 
new managers with less sunk emotional capital in the firm. This highlights the need for new 
management to better understand the link between employment and performance in the specific 
corporate setting of the acquired firm.  Finally, when viewed in the context of other recent work 
in the field, our findings justify the usefulness of segregating private equity acquisitions into 
different categories as each may have different employment consequences.     
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ENDNOTES 
1  The European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA) defines public-to-
private transactions as “a transaction involving an offer for the entire share capital of a listed 
company by a new company and the subsequent re-registration of that target company as a 
private company”. 
 
2
   As discussed in the literature review earlier. 
 
3
  The average (median) turnover for the sample companies is £207m (£69.2m) compared to 
£242.2m (£77.7) for the control companies. The differences in means and medians are not 
statistically significant at any conventional level. 
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Table 1: Employment Effects of Management Buy-Outs/Private Equity Acquisitions 
 
Author(s) (year) Period of Study Details of Sample 
 
Country 
 
 
Main Findings 
Kaplan (1989) 1980-1986 
 
76 large management buy-outs 
of public companies (48 of 
which have post-buyout data on 
employment) 
 
 
 
US 
 
 No evidence of significant employment reductions post buy-out (50% of firms actually 
increase employment). 
 When divestments are taken into account, more than 60% of firms increase employment. 
 Overall, no evidence to support the notion that buy-out gains come from the firing of 
employees. 
 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) 1981-1986 
12,896 manufacturing plants 
linked to firms subject to large 
(>$35) leveraged buy-outs.  
Data involves matching buy-out 
data with Census Bureau 
Longitudinal Research Database 
 
US 
 
 Evidence that post-buy-out there is reduction in the supervisor (non-production) to 
production staff ratio. 
 Evidence of an increase in the wage levels of production workers. 
  
Bacon, Wright and Demina (2004) 
Survey 
undertaken in 
1998-99 
Questionnaire survey of UK 
firms experiencing an MBO 
between 1994-97 (148 usable 
responses) 
 
 
 
UK 
 
 A significant proportion (often more than 50%) of MBOs reported an increase in the 
importance of HRM and the resources devoted to it after the MBO. 
 Specific areas of improvement included: increased employment, greater employee 
involvement, increased training, greater employee flexibility, more performance appraisals 
and merit pay, and an increase in share ownership by staff. 
 Both MBOs involving outside managers and those involving employees had a more 
positive impact on employees than ‘normal’ incumbent manager-led MBOs. 
 The strategy of the MBO also impacts on HRM with customer-focused strategies being 
more favourable to HRM development (compared to defensive-orientated MBOs). 
 
Harris, Siegel and Wright (2005) 1982-1999 
Plant-level data from 4,877 
plants involved in MBOs and 
30,875 not involved in MBOs in 
the UK 
 
UK 
 
• Evidence that MBO plants were less efficient than others in the same industry orior to 
MBO. 
• After MBO, MBO plants are more efficient than their industry counterparts. 
• Some evidence that the improved post-MBO effic iency may be largely due to a reduction 
in the labour intensity of production due to the outsourcing of intermediate goods and 
materials. 
 
Bruining, Boselie, Wright and Bacon 
(2005) 
 
Survey 
undertaken 
between 1999-
 
Questionnaire survey of UK and 
Dutch firms subject to an MBO 
(between 1994-97 for UK and 
 
 
UK and 
Netherlands 
 
 In both countries, there is evidence that MBOs have a positive impact on HR practices (e.g. 
increases in training, employee involvement, the number of employees and pay levels). 
 The impact is stronger in the non-institutionalised employment setting of the UK compared 
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2001 between 1992-98 for the 
Netherlands) 
to the Netherlands. 
 However, HRM practices overall are still stronger in Dutch MBO firms compared to their 
UK counterparts. 
 
Amess and Wright (2007) 1999-2004 1,350 LBO firms and a control 
sample of 4,029 non-LBO firms 
 
 
 
 
UK 
 
 In the case of all LBOs, there is no discernable difference in employment growth compared 
to non-LBOs. 
 In the case of all LBOs, there is evidence of lower wage growth compared to non-LBOs. 
 When segragated between MBOs and MBIs, MBOs have higher employment growth and 
MBIs have lower employment growth compared to their matched samples.   
 Both MBOs and MBIs have a negative impact on wage growth compared to matched 
firms. 
 
Amess, Brown and Thompson (2007) 1998 
1959 firms and 27,263 
employees from the UK’s 
Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey 
 
 
UK 
 
 MBO firms have lower levels of firm-level supervision when there is a higher proportion 
of craft and skilled service.  
 Employees in MBO firms have more discretion over their own work practices. 
 
Bacon, Wright, Demina, Bruining and 
Boselie (2008) 
1998 (UK) and 
2001 
(Netherlands) 
Survey of firms involved in 
MBOs in the UK (between 1994 
and 1997) and in the 
Netherlands (between 1992 and 
1998) 
UK and The 
Netherlands 
 
 
• Evidence that MBOs resulted in an increase in the number of high commitment practices 
reported. 
• Some evidence that the increase in the number of high commitment practices is less in the 
case of private equity backed MBOs, but no evidence of a decrease. 
• UK MBOs show a more noticeable increase in the number of high commitment practices 
after the MBO compared to MBOs in the Netherlands.  However, this may disguise the 
already high number of high commitment practices in firms in the Netherlands generally. 
 
Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner and 
Miranda (2008) 1980-2005 
5,000 MBO firms and a control 
sample of non-MBO firms 
 
 
 
US 
 
• MBO firms have lower employment growth both before and after the MBO compared to a 
matched sample of non-MBO firms. 
• Up to three years after the MBO employment growth is significantly lower than the control 
group but this reverses in years +4 and +5 when employment growth at MBO firms is 
higher. 
• Post-acquisition, the levels of hiring between MBO and non-MBO firms are similar but the 
overall differences in employment are accounted for by the loss of existing jobs in MBO 
firms, possibly due to closure/sale of unprofitable segments. 
• Above findings relate to MBOs in retail trade, services and financial services but no 
significant employment differences are identified between MBO and non-MBO firms in 
general manufacturing. 
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Weir, Jones and Wright (2008) 1998-2004 122 firms involved in public-to-private transactions 
 
 
UK 
 
• No evidence that firms lose jobs immediately prior to going private. 
• Loss of jobs after going private is at a lower rate than for firms in the same industry 
remaining public. 
• In years +4 and +5 after going private there is no evidence of job losses in contrast to firms 
remaining public which exhibit job losses. 
• Some evidence that going private firms increase employment but not getting back to pre-
transaction levels. 
 
Amess and Wright (2010) 1993-2004 533 LBO firms and a control 
sample of non-LBO firms 
 
UK 
 
• No evidence of employment differences between LBO and non-LBO firms. 
• No evidence of employment differences between private equity backed LBO firms and 
either non-private equity backed LBO firms or a control group of non-LBO firms. 
 
Bacon, Wright, Scholes and Meuleman 
(2010) 2008 
 
Survey of 190 private equity-
backed buy-outs companies 
across Europe and interviews 
with 16 managers of buy-out 
companies.   
 
European 
countries 
 
 
• PE investment does not result in changes to union recognition, membership density or 
changes in management attitudes to union membership. 
• Greater levels of employee consultation by management after PE transactions. 
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Table 2:   Industrial classification of private equity acquisitions 
 
Industry 
Leisure 
Retail 
Software 
Support Services 
Restaurants and Pubs 
Real Estate 
Financial 
Chemicals 
Electrical and Electronics 
Shipping and Ports 
Food Processors 
Media 
Pharmaceuticals 
Publishing and Printing 
Water Supply 
Other 
Total 
Number of Targets 
8 
8 
8 
8 
6 
5 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
7 
73 
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Table 3: Annual Breakdown of Private Equity Acquisitions and Control Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Sample 
companies 
9 2 4 11 7 14 26 No of Companies 
Control 
companies 
9 2 4 11 7 12 23 
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Table 4: Availability of Data for Private Equity Acquisitions and Control Companies for 
Three Years Before and Three Years After the Acquisition 
 
Year 0 is the year when the acquisition was completed. 
 
 Year  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Sample 
companies 
67 72 72  48 50 42 
No of 
Companies Control 
companies 
63 63 63  64 64 61 
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Table 5: Growth Rate in the Number of Employees and Number of Employees 
 
The growth rate in the number of employees is the percentage growth rate in the average annual number of employees. Panel A contains the 
descriptive statistics for the sample companies as well as the control companies. The numbers in italic in Panel A are the numbers (levels) of 
employees. Panel B contains the tests for the differences in means (medians) between each year and the following year for the sample 
companies and the control companies, respectively. Panel C contains the tests for the differences in means (medians) between the sample 
companies and the control companies for each year. The asterisks indicate a 5% (**) and 10% (*) level of statistical significance. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Mean  
2,329 
11.30 
2,333 
7.85 
2,520 
-1.62 
2,609 
1.97 
2,668 
2.53 
2,944 Sample 
Companies Median  
721 
2.89 
657 
0.00 
651 
-2.76 
482 
1.51 
660 
1.20 
748 
Mean  
1,526 
14.37 
1,479 
29.29 
1,810 
15.15 
1,934 
3.94 
1,880 
-1.58 
1,929 Control 
Companies Median  
580 
0.63 
603 
1.04 
650 
1.97 
638 
1.29 
648 
-1.44 
715 
Sample Companies  67 
67 
72 
71 
72 
47 
48 
46 
49 
41 
41 
Observations 
Control Companies  62 
62 
63 
62 
62 
62 
62 
61 
62 
59 
59 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
  
Difference 
between year -3 
and year -2 
Difference 
between year -2 
and year -1 
Difference 
between year -1 
and year 1 
Difference 
between year 1 
and year 2 
Difference 
between year 2 
and year 3 
T-test for differences 
in means 
 0.63 
 
1.61 
 
-0.63 
 
-0.15 
 Sample 
Companies Wilcoxon test for differences in 
medians 
 0.17 
 
1.72* -1.24 
 
0.32 
 
T-test for differences 
in means 
 -0.64 
 
0.72 
 
1.89* 1.52 
 Control 
Companies Wilcoxon test for 
differences in 
medians 
 -0.61 
 
-0.16 
 
0.26 
 
2.17** 
 
Panel C: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and control companies 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
T-test for differences in 
means 
 -0.22 
 
-1.18 
 
-2.29** -0.48 
 
1.23 
 
 Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
 0.79 
 
-0.16 
 
-1.96** -0.18 
 
1.27 
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Table 6: Profit over Turnover 
 
Profit is company profit before interest and taxation in £000s and turnover is company turnover in £000s. Profit/Turnover is in percentages. 
Panel A contains the descriptive statistics for the sample companies as well as the control companies. Panel B contains the tests for the 
differences in means (medians) between each year and the following year for the sample companies and the control companies, respectively. 
Panel C contains the tests for the differences in means (medians) between the sample companies and the control companies for each year. The 
asterisk indicate a 10% (*) level of statistical significance. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Mean -18.76 -2.63 -11.52 -13.95 10.65 9.28 
Sample 
Companies Median 8.77 9.59 9.35 6.74 4.61 6.05 
Mean 3.11 8.73 10.87 15.69 -4.22 -21.63 
Control 
Companies Median 7.50 8.30 6.11 7.34 5.82 3.65 
Sample Companies 67 72 72 47 49 41 
Observations Control Companies 63 63 63 63 63 60 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
 
 
 
 
Difference 
between year -3 
and year -2 
Difference 
between year -2 
and year -1 
Difference 
between year -1 
and year 1 
Difference 
between year 1 
and year 2 
Difference 
between year 
2 and year 3 
T-test for differences 
in means 
-0.78 
 
0.54 
 
0.10 
 
-1.10 
 
0.16 
 Sample 
Companies Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.48 
 
0.17 
 
1.32 
 
-0.61 
 
0.17 
 
T-test for differences 
in means 
-0.96 
 
-0.48 
 
-0.54 
 
1.68* 
 
0.71 
 Control 
Companies Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.57 
 
0.42 
 
0.14 
 
1.14 
 
0.71 
 
Panel C: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and control companies 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
T-test for differences in 
means 
-1.07 
 
-1.11 
 
-1.48 
 
-1.39 
 
1.39 
 
-1.06 
 
 Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
0.55 
 
0.75 
 
0.83 
 
-0.97 
 
0.80 
 
1.15 
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Table 7: Profit over Employees 
 
Profit is company profit before interest and tax in £000s. Employees is the annual average number of employees. Panel A contains the 
descriptive statistics for the sample companies as well as the control companies. Panel B contains the tests for the differences in means 
(medians) between each year and the following year for the sample companies and the control companies, respectively. Panel C contains the 
tests for the differences in means (medians) between the sample companies and the control companies for each year.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Mean 24.20 27.38 18.25 15.07 34.28 28.19 
Sample 
Companies Median 5.73 6.35 6.47 3.79 5.97 5.36 
Mean 69.0 71.14 78.85 107.19 12.01 -9.83 
Control 
Companies Median 6.30 8.98 7.95 6.78 5.72 4.50 
Sample Companies  67 72 72 47 48 40 
Observations Control Companies 62 63 62 62 62 59 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
  
Difference 
between year -3 
and year -2 
Difference 
between year -2 
and year -1 
Difference 
between year -1 
and year 1 
Difference 
between year 1 
and year 2 
Difference 
between year 
2 and year 3 
T-test for 
differences in means 
-0.10 
 
0.27 
 
0.09 
 
-0.76 
 
0.23 
 Sample 
Companies Wilcoxon test for differences in 
medians 
-0.61 
 
0.09 
 
1.15 
 
-0.82 
 
0.09 
 
T-test for 
differences in means 
-0.05 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.46 
 
1.16 
 
.21 
 Control 
Companies Wilcoxon test for 
differences in 
medians 
-1.16 
 
0.46 
 
-0.13 
 
0.96 
 
0.35 
 
Panel C: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and control companies 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
T-test for differences in 
means 
-1.09 
 
-1.17 
 
-1.46 
 
-1.51 
 
0.30 
 
0.37 
 
 Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
0.09 
 
-0.34 
 
-0.07 
 
-1.30 
 
0.39 
 
0.76 
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Table 8: Turnover over Employees 
 
Turnover is company turnover in £000s. Employees is the annual average number of employees. Panel A contains the descriptive statistics for 
the sample companies as well as the control companies. Panel B contains the tests for the differences in means (medians) between each year 
and the following year for the sample companies and the control companies, respectively. Panel C contains the tests for the differences in 
means (medians) between the sample companies and the control companies for each year.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Mean 138.98 144.48 144.10 147.60 166.54 159.52 
Sample 
Companies Median 101.02 107.45 110.67 111.54 122.77 124.79 
Mean 305.80 346.50 279.71 262.00 318.39 324.62 
Control 
Companies Median 99.40 110.86 113.58 123.41 137.86 135.39 
Sample Companies 67 72 72 48 49 41 
Observations Control Companies 62 63 62 62 62 59 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
  
Difference 
between year -3 
and year -2 
Difference 
between year -2 
and year -1 
Difference 
between year -1 
and year 1 
Difference 
between year 1 
and year 2 
Difference 
between year 2 
and year 3 
T-test for differences 
in means 
-0.16 
 
0.01 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.61 
 
0.22 
 Sample 
Companies Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.65 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.79 
 
-0.21 
 
T-test for differences 
in means 
-0.24 
 
0.41 
 
0.14 
 
-0.44 
 
-0.04 
 Control 
Companies Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.70 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.56 
 
-0.82 
 
-0.26 
 
Panel C: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and control companies 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
T-test for differences in 
means 
-1.58 
 
-1.59 
 
-1.52 
 
-1.22 
 
-1.36 
 
-1.27 
 
 Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.42 
 
-0.75 
 
-0.79 
 
-0.81 
 
0.86 
 
0.89 
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 Table 9: Wages over Employees 
 
Wages is total wages and salaries in £000s. Employees is the annual average number of employees. Panel A contains the descriptive statistics 
for the sample companies as well as the control companies. Panel B contains the tests for the differences in means (medians) between each year 
and the following year for the sample companies and the control companies, respectively. Panel C contains the tests for the differences in 
means (medians) between the sample companies and the control companies for each year.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Mean 30.08 32.03 34.46 32.31 34.09 33.80 
Sample 
Companies Median 24.95 24.30 24.51 26.14 27.62 27.79 
Mean 34.80 35.50 33.72 44.34 46.73 49.32 
Control 
Companies Median 26.12 26.49 25.52 27.67 31.19 35.13 
Sample Companies 67 72 72 48 49 41 
Observations Control Companies 62 63 62 62 62 59 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
  
Difference 
between year -3 
and year -2 
Difference 
between year -2 
and year -1 
Difference 
between year -1 
and year 1 
Difference 
between year 1 
and year 2 
Difference 
between year 
2 and year 3 
T-test for differences 
in means 
-0.51 
 
-0.53 
 
0.43 
 
-0.42 
 
0.07 
 Sample 
Companies Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.29 
 
-0.43 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.74 
 
-0.13 
 
T-test for differences 
in means 
-0.09 
 
0.29 
 
-1.14 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.23 
 Control 
Companies Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.43 
 
-0.24 
 
-1.08 
 
-0.82 
 
-0.42 
 
Panel C: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and control companies 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
T-test for differences in 
means 
-0.78 
 
-0.60 
 
0.15 
 
-1.17 
 
-1.42 
 
-1.46 
 
 Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.10 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.98 
 
-1.16 
 
-1.29 
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Table 10: Differences in Unexpected Performance Improvements 
 
The performance measure is profit over turnover. Profit is company profit before interest and taxation in £000s and turnover 
is company turnover in £000s. Profit/Turnover is in percentages. The difference in unexpected performance improvements is 
defined as the difference between the actual performance in a given year and the mean for the analysts’ performance forecast 
for a sample firm minus the equivalent difference for the same year for the sample firm’s control firm. Following Smart and 
Waldfogel (1994), the performance forecasts are all made in the year preceding the acquisition, i.e. year -1. Panel A contains 
the descriptive statistics for the sample companies as well as the control companies. Panel B contains the tests for the 
differences in means (medians) between each year and the following year for the sample companies and the control 
companies, respectively. Panel C contains the tests for the differences in means (medians) between the sample companies 
and the control companies for each year.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Mean 1.24 2.01 -0.71 
Median -0.02 -0.01 -0.71 
Observations 14 9 1 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
T-test for differences in 
means 
0.86 
 
1.03 
 
– 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.22 
 
0.53 
 
-1.00 
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